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Introduction
Recent years have witnessed a growing interest of information flow security analysis due to their connection to the problem of protecting confidential data. The confidentiality policy concerns multi-level security systems. It states that secret data must be protected during the computation and there should be no leakage of that data through public output channel.
Information flow security is formalized as noninterference, which states that final values of lowsecurity variables must be independent of initial highsecurity variables [1] . Information flow security analysis verifies if a program respects certain confidentiality policy. Denning and Denning [2] were first to perform static information flow analysis for checking programs for confidentiality.
Unfortunately, despite a long history, relatively less interest has been given to low-level languages [3] . Some prevalent trends in software call for techniques to certify machine-code for secure information flow. Among them, dynamic extensibility, where a trusted computing system is extended by importing and executing untrusted mobile code. For example, web browsers plug-ins and operating systems extensions.
In absence of a reliable protection mechanism that can verify if a piece of downloaded code maintains confidentiality end-users may avoid executing the code due to the concern that it may leak confidential data. While it protects end-users, this strategy; however prevents them to benefit from the richness of the web.
This paper shows how to determine statically whether it is safe to install and execute a downloaded untrusted code. It presents an approach for certifying RISC-style assembly programs for secure information flow based on the idea of Proof Carrying Code (PCC) [4] . The downloaded code is analyzed based on an information flow type system and security conditions are generated. Proofs of the security conditions are then generated and checked on the host machine by the code consumer's system. If the proofs are valid, the untrusted code can be installed and executed safely.
An important feature of the proposed information flow security analysis technique is that it certifies assembly programs generated by general-purpose offthe-shelf compilers. This, on one hand, gives the code producers flexibility in the choice of the high-level language, in which programs are written and, on the other hand, allows end-users to check a wide variety of programs, and thus can be an effective tool for protecting confidentiality.
The work presented here builds upon our previous work [5] , in which we developed a type system for information flow analysis of RISC-style assembly programs. The security analysis method is performed based on typing rules of [5] .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 gives a summary of the related work. The security analyzer is presented in section 3 describing its different components. Section 4 concludes.
Related Work
Despite a large body of research works on language-based information flow security, relatively little known have been devoted to assembly languages [3] . In the following, we constrain ourselves to discussing very closely related work; in particular those works that studied information flow analysis at assembly level. The interested reader can refer to [3] for a more complete overview on language-based information flow security.
A low-level, secure calculus that use linear continuations guarantees noninterference property is presented in [6] ; however the language is not an assembly language as it has if-then-else structure and has no registers. Recent research works [7] [8] [9] studied extending typed assembly language (TAL) with information flow property in order to enforce noninterference in RISC-style assembly programs. These works assume existence of special compilers (certifying compilers) that generate the target assembly languages through a trusted compilation. In contrast, the proposed security analyzer operates directly on assembly language programs generated by generalpurpose off-the-shelf compilers. Moreover, abovementioned techniques do not produce explicit proofs for the programs acceptable by such techniques.
Information flow security analysis of Java bytecode has been studied by several authors. An information flow type system for a simplified version of JVM language is developed in [10] and later on for an extended fragment of JVM language in [11] . Besides, [12] proposed a technique for information flow analysis of Java bytecode using Boolean functions. Methods based on model checking are used for certifying Java applets [13] and a refined technique of [13] is presented in [14] for a subset of JVML. In [15] an approach is proposed for information flow analysis of Java bytecode similar to type-level abstract interpretation used in standard Java bytecode verification. The most prominent difference between the proposed security analysis technique and techniques of [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] is that they treat a stack-based assembly language which is much different from RISC architecture. Furthermore, none of the works [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] produces explicit machine-checkable proofs of confidentiality conformance.
The Information Flow Security Analyzer
Our goal is to verify that untrusted downloaded programs maintain the confidentiality of host machines and do not reveal data that they should not. To do this we develop an information flow security analyzer that performs a static information flow analysis of the untrusted code to determine whether it is safe to install and execute the code. Figure 1 shows the high level structure of the information flow security analyzer. It consists of a number of components: information flow type system, a Verification Condition Generator (VCG), a Theorem Prover, and a Proof Checker.
Most important high-level characteristics of the proposed information flow security analysis technique are (i) it operates directly on machine-code; (ii) it enforces information flow policy, namely noninterference policy on RISC-style assembly programs; (iii) it generates explicit machine-checkable security proofs (certificate) for assembly programs that are proved secure;.
To perform information flow analysis of assembly programs, the issues we face include: (i) reuse of registers: a register holds values of different variables at different program points; registers cannot be assigned fixed security levels; (ii) assembly programs lack the high-level control flow structures, which may present in source programs and are necessary for tracking implicit information flows; this calls for a mechanism to retrieve such structures.
The information flow security analysis is divided into four phases: developing information flow policy, generating the verification conditions, generating the proofs, and checking the proofs. These phases are illustrated in the context of a simple example. Figure  3 .b. The type specification of the function main, shown in Figure 3 .c, states that the register r x has low-security level, register r flag has high-security level, register r n has high-security level, and the function security signature has low-security level. The invocation specification states that the arrays x and flag will be passed through the registers r x and r flag correspondingly and the result will be returned by means of register r n .
Phase 1: Developing information flow policy that defines the authorized information flows within assembly programs and serves as the basis of the security analysis technique. The main component of the information flow policy is a type system for information flow analysis that control information flow within assembly programs. Figure 2 shows the type system for information flow analysis of assembly programs, which has been described in details in our previous work [5] . So, we will describe it briefly in Section 3.1.
Phase 2:
Generating the verification conditions scans the target code forwardly and produces security conditions whose provability is a sufficient condition that untrusted code has secure information flow. The security conditions are produced by the verification condition generator (VCG) component.
Phase 3: Generating the proofs takes the verification conditions produced by the VCG and produces their detailed proofs. This phase is performed by the theorem prover component.
Phase 4:
Checking the proofs is performed by the proof checker component that verifies that the proofs generated by the theorem prover are indeed valid and pertaining to the verification conditions generated by the VCG. If the proofs are valid, the untrusted code is considered secure and is allowed to install and execute.
In the following, we present the components of the proposed information flow security analyzer.
The Information Flow Type System
The information flow type system, shown in Figure  2 , is a set of typing rules for information flow analysis of SAL assembly language programs that enforces confidentiality through noninterference. To formalize the type system, we assume a two-point security lattice L={low, high}, partially ordered by ⊑, where low⊑high; low stands for low-security data and high for high-security data.
The syntax and semantics of SAL assembly language as well as the meanings of typing rules and how they control the flow of information within SAL assembly programs are given in our previous work [5] and for the space constraints they will not be presented here.
The Verification Condition Generator
The VCG is a verification condition generator for SAL language. The VCG is implemented as an abstract executor that executes the assembly code abstractly (operating on security levels instead of actual values) one function at a time based on typing rules of the security type system of Figure 2 . Each class of instructions has a corresponding rule and the VCG builds an abstract state obtained by abstractly executing of an instruction by applying of its rule.
The state of abstract executor is defined by a triple AE(i, σ, so), where i is the value of program counter referring to the instruction to be executed next, σ:Regs→L is an abstract register state which is a mapping from registers names to security levels from a security lattice L; σ(pc) is the security context of current instruction, and so is the stack offset.
The abstract executor starts executing the body of function F with an initial state AE F (i 0 , σ 0 , so 0 ), where • F is the function being executed; • i 0 = 0, the value of program counter referring to the first instruction in function F; • σ 0 = Pre F , the initial abstract register state, initialized to the security levels as specified by precondition, Pre F ; • so 0 = Arg F , the stack offset is initialized with the arguments of function F, Arg F ; • σ 0 (pc) = Sig F , the security context is initialized to the security level assigned to function F, Sig F . The security level, Sig F , is initially propagated as a security context for all instructions in function F. The definition of the abstract executor is formally given in Figure 4 and can be informally described as follows. For arithmetic and logical operations, memory reading instruction (load), and instructions of moving data between registers or between registers and stack locations the abstract executor updates abstract register state by mapping the destination register into the least upper bound of the security levels of source operands taking into accounts the current security context. In the case of conditional branch, both branches are abstractly executed. The least upper bound of the security levels of the conditional register and the current security context is propagated through the conditional region as a security context for all instructions that are executed under the control of conditional expression. The VCG considers memory write, functions calls, and functions returns to be risky instructions that may violate information flow policy. For each of these instructions, the VCG constructs a proper verification condition and sends it to the theorem prover to verify. For memory write instruction the VCG generates the verification condition safewr and sends it requesting the theorem prover to verify whether it is safe to write a given value to a given memory location with given security levels. In the case of instruction of function call the VCG generates the verification condition safecall and sends it along with computed security levels of parameters and the current security context requesting the theorem prover to check whether it is safe to call a given function with given security levels of parameters. The VCG continues abstractly executing the function F with new abstract registers state, assuming that the postcondition of the called function holds. Similarly, for a function return instruction the VCG requests the theorem prover to verify whether it is safe to return from the function by generating the verification condition saferet and sending it to the theorem prover. Figure 5 shows a fragment of logic used by the VCG to generate the verification 
The Theorem Prover
To prove the verification conditions generated by the VCG we use a theorem prove for first-order predicate logic, which is also able to generate their detailed proofs. In the proposed security analysis technique the theorem prover is guaranteed to prove the verification conditions produced by the VCG automatically because the verification conditions are relatively simple and easy to prove.
Based on the logic that the host machine specifies, the theorem prover attempts to prove the verification conditions emitted by the VCG and generates their detailed proofs. Theorem proving process is guided by a logic program that describes the absence of illegal information flows in the assembly code. The logic program includes a set of proof rules, which are in essence logical formalizations of security typing rules of Figure 2. 
The Proof Checker
After proving the verification conditions by the theorem prover, their proofs are sent to the proof checker for validation. It should be noted that, though the theorem prover forms a part of the security analyzer, it is not part of trusted computing base (TCB) infrastructure, and thus it is not trusted. The outputs of 
Conclusion
We have presented an approach for secure information flow analysis of RISC-style assembly language programs based on the idea of Proof Carrying Code. The proposed approach provides an adequate assurance of protecting the confidentiality of information, and thus enabling end-users to protect their confidential data. Moreover, the presence of explicit security proofs that are generated and checked by the security analyzer provides distrustful users with a strong guarantee of protecting confidentiality making them more confident in the protection mechanism. To the best of our knowledge it is the first work to generate machine-checkable proofs of conformance of machine-code programs to certain information flow policy. 
